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IS THERE A PARADOX IN AMENDING A SACRED TEXT?
BEAU BRESLIN*
The occasion to attend the Maryland Constitutional Law
Schmooze on the topic of Religion and the Constitution has afforded
me the chance to revisit a distinctively secular book that, curiously
enough, provides wonderful insight into the relationship between
spirituality and text.  In Sanford Levinson’s Constitutional Faith, the au-
thor examines the self-conscious act of signing the constitutional text,
the practice of (re)affirming one’s fidelity to the original constitu-
tional instrument by literally placing pen to paper (parchment?), and
publicly acknowledging acceptance.1  He recounts a story in which he
was asked to sign the Constitution during the celebrations surround-
ing the document’s bicentennial, and how his decision to sign was not
without considerable anguish.2  What does it mean to pledge alle-
giance to the Constitution by “adding one’s name” to the document?3
“How do we stand vis-a`-vis the Constitution” when we are encouraged
to carry out the representational act of ratification?4  How can we turn
a blind eye to the startling inadequacies of the document?  And yet
how can we not endorse a document that, for better or for worse,
changed the nature of ordered government throughout the world?
Broadly speaking, Levinson’s story (and his dilemma) is intended
to draw attention to two related measures, which are the manner and
the degree to which American citizens endorse the country’s constitu-
tional charter.  He is curious about how individuals embrace the con-
stitutional text—how they make it their own—as well as the depth to
which Americans will support the country’s constitutional narrative.
He is, of course, not alone in examining these theoretical practices.
Others have been equally curious about various modes or methods of
embracing the Constitution since the moment of its formal ratifica-
tion.  The act of taking an oath, for instance, has been scrutinized as a
Copyright  2009 by Beau Breslin.
* Skidmore College.
1. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 180–94 (1988) [hereinafter LEVINSON,
FAITH].
2. Id. at 180–84; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3–9
(2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC] (revisiting this moment and a similar one at
the National Constitution Center to further examine the theory and practice of contempo-
rary ratification).
3. LEVINSON, FAITH, supra note 1, at 180–84. R
4. Id. at 180.
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method of expressing allegiance to the text.5  Public leaders, teachers,
civil servants, and others regularly ask American citizens to reengage
in various ways with the spirit of the constitutional document.6  Muse-
ums and exhibits have been built or installed that focus on the impor-
tance of the Constitution.7  And, of course, scholars have long been
fixated on the text and the implications associated with contemporary
approaches to ratification.  William Harris is fascinated by the citi-
zenry’s ongoing dialogue with the Constitution.8  More recently,
Mariah Zeisberg asked whether citizens are engaged in a “new fram-
ing” by virtue of the National Constitution Center’s interactive exhib-
its, including one that forces us to confront directly the self-conscious
act of signing.9
There are innumerable reasons why one might choose to sign or
not sign—to symbolically ratify or reject—the Constitution; some are
silly and some are genuinely profound.  Levinson draws our attention
to several of the more common reasons: For some, he says, adding
one’s signature to the text represents a sense of duty or obligation, a
more or less uninformed commitment based on the assumption that
support for the principles at the center of America’s political experi-
ment automatically signals support for the nation’s fundamental
law.10  The sentiment seems to be that the Constitution ought to be
ratified because it is symbolic of the virtues of a free and sovereign
people.
On the other hand, there are very significant reasons to reject the
Constitution, says Levinson.  It implicitly or explicitly perpetuated the
institution of chattel slavery; it did not recognize a significant portion
of the American population; several of its clauses and provisions are
5. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1800–01 (2005) (noting that government officials take an oath to the Constitution and
therefore may have a greater moral duty to obey it than ordinary citizens).
6. Almost every presidential inaugural address is a variation on the theme of the im-
portance of America’s constitutional text. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Ad-
dress (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 263–65 (Roy
P. Basler ed., 1953) (invoking constitutional text to address issues of fugitive slaves and the
status of the Union).
7. The National Constitution Center and the National Archives are just two of the
institutions that highlight the place of the text in America’s cultural life.
8. See WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION xiii (1993) (emphasiz-
ing “the interplay between Constitution (with a large “C”) and constitution (with a small
“c”), document and polity”).
9. Mariah Zeisberg, A New Framing? Constitutional Representation at Philadelphia’s Na-
tional Constitution Center, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 553, 555, 561 (2008).
10. See LEVINSON, FAITH, supra note 1, at 180–81 (casting virtual signing as “a sign of our R
willingness to join in affirming a ‘constitutional faith,’ whatever the attendant difficulties in
giving content to the notion”).
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now outdated; and so on.11  In his most recent book, Our Undemocratic
Constitution, Levinson continues his inquiry into the usefulness and
value of our current constitutional document, claiming that after a
lifetime of reflection he has decided now to “reject[ ] the invitation to
re-sign the Constitution.”12  Citing the “inadequacies” of the Constitu-
tion today,13 and the inability of American citizens to engage mean-
ingfully with the document,14 Levinson suggests that now is the time
to abandon this particular charter and summon a new Constitutional
Convention.15
Embedded within these and other discussions about support for
the Constitution, and about the self-conscious act of signing the docu-
ment, the terms “reverence” and “venerate” inevitably appear.16  In-
deed, the constitutional text is so ubiquitous in the history of the
United States, and even in the history of constitutionalism around the
world, that it is not foolhardy to assume that this particular charter is
worthy of such high praise.  Veneration for the Constitution, or at
least the idea of the Constitution, commenced long ago and by some
very prominent figures.  There are hints throughout the Federalist Pa-
pers—especially in those penned by James Madison—that the success
of the constitutional order depends on a healthy veneration for the
text.17  Half a century after Madison, Abraham Lincoln spoke of con-
stitutional perpetuity as a necessary feature of regime stability.18  Presi-
dents from Washington to Obama have spoken with reverence for the
constitutional instrument.19  Recently, the National Constitution
Center co-published a survey asking citizens about the various levels of
11. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 1, 2–4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levin-
son eds., 1998) (highlighting moral and structural constitutional inadequacies); cf. Mark
Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL
TRAGEDIES, supra, at 43, 48 (“Why should one interpret a constitution that may contain
stupid, outdated, or venal provisions?  The answer may be that constitutions are com-
promises between people with very different notions of what is stupid, outdated, or
venal.”).
12. LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC, supra note 2, at 5. R
13. Id. at 5–9.
14. Id. at 16–20.
15. Id. at 9.
16. E.g., LEVINSON, FAITH, supra note 1, at 9; LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC, supra note 2, at R
16–20.
17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 257 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(suggesting that a “reverence for the laws” should be a goal of the new government).
18. See Lincoln, supra note 6, at 264 (suggesting that perpetuity of the Union is implied R
by the Constitution).
19. See, e.g., President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address (“[O]ur Founding Fathers, faced
with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the
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their commitment to the Constitution, suggesting in some cases that
respect for the text borders on awe.20  David M. Kennedy, the eminent
Stanford historian, even goes so far as to say the following about the
American Constitution: “It is our most fundamental political docu-
ment, reverenced by all, the supposed cement of our society . . . .”21
Levinson, of course, laments the unreflective veneration or reverence
for the constitutional text, but even he has to admit that the sentiment
is out there among America’s citizens.22  Siding decidedly with
Thomas Jefferson, who believed that constitutional texts were not to
be revered and were to be rewritten every generation, Levinson argues
that the first step to constitutional renewal is for Americans to over-
come our curious reverence for the constitutional charter.23
To suggest that the Constitution is worthy of reverence is to sug-
gest that it merits special, heightened, even religious, status.  Presuma-
bly, those who revere the text worship its many clauses, provisions,
aspirations, and rights protections.  Doubtless, they also revere the
broad contours of the Constitution’s fundamental message(s) and,
more generally, how those messages continue to inform the political
and constitutional dialogue both at home and around the world.
Americans are proud of their constitutional charter (even if they can-
not tell us what it says).24  Moreover, they believe certain parts of the
text are truly special.  The Preamble, for example, resonates with an
American citizenry sophisticated enough to understand the aspira-
rights of man—a charter expanded by the blood of generations.  Those ideals still light the
world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake.”).
20. See STEVE FARKAS ET AL., KNOWING IT BY HEART: AMERICANS CONSIDER THE CONSTITU-
TION AND ITS MEANING 9–10, 13 (2002), http://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/
10207/5622/knowing_by_heart.pdf (stating that 91% of Americans believe the Constitu-
tion protects the interest of all people, 85% believe that it is a major reason for America’s
success, and that Americans generally recognize the freedoms set by the Constitution).
21. David M. Kennedy, Reverence, Ignorance and Blazing Apathy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1986, § 7, at 11 (book review) (emphasis added).
22. See LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC, supra note 2, at 16–17 (recognizing that some Ameri- R
cans “venerate” the Constitution so much that they “find the notion of seriously criticizing
it almost sacrilegious”).
23. Id. at 16–20; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12,
1816), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 40–42 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1903) (“[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 454, 459 (“Every constitution, then, and every law,
naturally expires at the end of thirty-four years.  If it be enforced longer, it is an act of
force, and not of right.”).
24. See FARKAS ET AL., supra note 20, at 10, 13–17 (noting that while 85% of Americans R
believe that the Constitution is a major reason for America’s success, only 16% claim to
have a detailed knowledge of it).
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tional character of a constitutional instrument.25  The self-referential
quality of the Preamble’s linguistic style,26 combined with its tangible
promises of liberty, security, and justice, dovetail nicely with the widely
respected (and revered?) language of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.  More evidently, the Bill of Rights has come to represent the
heart of the constitutional text, and in a society infatuated with per-
sonal liberty, the reality that a list of freedoms is perceived as the cor-
nerstone of the document will likely elevate that document to
reverential standing.  To be sure, the Bill of Rights has in many ways
eclipsed the original constitutional document in the minds and hearts
of the American populace.  As I have written elsewhere, “[b]oth liter-
ally and figuratively, the Constitution’s role in organizing various po-
litical institutions is now overshadowed by the perception that the
text’s first priority is to identify and protect individual rights.”27  When
asked what the United States Constitution “means to them,” more
than half of the individuals surveyed responded that the document is
about “freedom” or that it establishes the institutional “basis of our
rights.”28  Many Americans revere the Constitution, but (unsurpris-
ingly) even more revere it because it is seen as the vehicle that pro-
tects individual freedom and liberty.
To revere is “to show devoted deferential honor to [or to] regard
as worthy of great honor.”29  One can revere something secular, but
the quality or character of respect that accompanies reverence and
veneration is usually reserved for the sacred texts of the world’s major
religions.30  Not mere endorsement or affirmation, reverence con-
25. See BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION-
ALITY 46–68 (2009) (examining the aspirational qualities of the preambles to the constitu-
tions of several nations).
26. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27 (1998) (“The Constitution, after all,
was not just a text, but an act—a doing, a constituting.  In the Preamble’s performative
utterance, ‘We the people . . . do’ alter the old and ordain and establish the new.”).
27. BRESLIN, supra note 25, at 83; see also Joshua Partlow, Latin America’s Document-Driven R
Revolutions; Teams of Spanish Scholars Helped Recast Constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009, at A1 (reporting that several Latin American countries are
undergoing “document-driven revolutions” or constitutional “re-founding[s],” in which re-
gimes are attempting to solidify power by, among other things, making grand promises in
their bills of rights) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Highlights of Telephone Survey of 1,000 U.S. Citizens Nationwide, http://ratify.
constitutioncenter.org/CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/NCCNationalPoll/Highlights
ofthePoll.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
29. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1002 (10th ed. 1996); see also THE RAN-
DOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1647 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed.
1987) (defining “revere” as “to regard with respect tinged with awe”).
30. Formal definitions of “reverence” and “sacred” typically include some reference to
religion. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1029 (de- R
fining “sacred” as “dedicated or set apart for the service or worship of a deity”); 8 THE
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notes a deeper, more profound commitment to the item or instru-
ment respected.  The definition of reverence is tied up with the
principle of faith, a largely unconfirmed (and unconfirmable) belief
in the greatness of an object, text, person, or idea.31  For example,
certain people might revere the word of God or the power of nature,
and if they do, they cherish those things as sacred.  As noted, many
revere the Constitution for what it says and what it represents, and
thus they also view that particular text as hallowed.32
The Constitution’s reverential status raises a host of questions, in-
cluding ones focused on the relationship between sacred texts and
amendability: If the Constitution is so worthy of reverence—if it is, as
many have suggested, sacred—should it also be alterable?  If it is a
hallowed institution, meriting the type of veneration typically reserved
for religious tomes and teachings, should we be so at ease about the
prospect of fundamental and radical structural change, especially if
we imagine that the power to alter the constitutional document is so
considerable that the text could conceivably be altered entirely out of
existence?33  If the Constitution is sacred, shouldn’t it also be sacro-
sanct?  Here, I am specifically referring to the formal power granted
in Article V to amend the text, rather than to the ability of the judici-
ary or other institutions to interpret the Constitution in ways that fun-
damentally change its meaning.  Article V grants authority to various
institutions—including Congress and the state legislatures—to pro-
pose amendments to the Constitution or to call conventions for the
purpose of proposing amendments to said text.34  The authority to
alter small sections or large chunks of the constitutional document is
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 818–19 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1991)
(defining “reverence” as “[d]eep respect and veneration for some place, thing, or person
regarded as having a sacred or exalted character”); 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
supra, at 338 (defining “sacred” as “[s]et apart for or dedicated to some religious purpose,
and hence entitled to veneration or religious respect; made holy by association with a god
or other object of worship; consecrated, hallowed”); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 29, at 1689 (defining “sacred” as “devoted or dedicated R
to a deity or some religious purpose; consecrated”).
31. See DAVID HUME, Of Miracles, in AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
reprinted in DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION 124–25 (Richard Popkin ed., 2d ed.
1998) (concluding that Christianity cannot be rooted in human reason).
32. See LEVINSON, FAITH, supra note 1, at 14–15 (highlighting instances of near-religious R
zeal for the Constitution as “a thread running through much American political rhetoric”).
33. Presumably, the power to amend the American Constitution allows for the possibil-
ity that an amendment could be passed that would remove the Constitution as the regime’s
governing charter. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 176; see also U.S. CONST. art. V. (containing only R
two limitations on what may be amended: (1) that Congress could not abolish slavery or
impose export taxes until 1808; and (2) that no State could be deprived of equal represen-
tation in the United States Senate).
34. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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embedded within the document itself; the rules for amendment, that
is, are outlined in the text itself.  This authority is a direct conse-
quence of the Framers’ Enlightenment beliefs, particularly in the im-
perfectability of human nature35 and the new “science of politics.”36
Of course, some will claim that the amendment process is itself
one of the reverential features of the American Constitution.37  The
capacity to change the document through addition is a crucial mecha-
nism aimed at constitutional maintenance, and without it the Consti-
tution becomes far less esteemed (and probably unworkable).38
Along with the capacity to interpret the text in different historical mo-
ments and within different historical contexts, the ability to alter the
document formally is what allows the text to stay current or timely.
Interestingly, Stephen Holmes has further insisted that the perennial
temporal problem faced by all constitutional regimes—namely, that a
contemporary democratic people agree to live by rules and proce-
dures established by a past generation of people—can be offset, at
least in part, by the capacity to amend the text.39  Holmes insists that
amendability is one antidote for the problem of precommitment.40
Even still, the power of amendment represents a curious and pos-
sibly disquieting component of a revered text.  If we take seriously the
various functions and features of a constitution, and we are willing to
35. See Sanford Levinson, Introduction to RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 3, 3 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (noting George Mason’s and George Washington’s realizations that
the Constitution would unavoidably contain imperfections).
36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 43 (referring to R
several advancements in political science that formed key elements of the American consti-
tutional system).
37. Scholars, including Levinson and Donald Lutz, have accurately noted that the
American Constitution, when compared to the constitutional texts of most other Western
regimes, is procedurally among the most difficult to amend. LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC,
supra note 2, at 21.  Even still, Lutz has also suggested that the possibility of altering the R
text to reflect critical political and cultural changes has, for many, come to symbolize
America’s promise of an open, democratic society. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 355–56 (1994), reprinted in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 35, at 237, 237–39 (arguing that the amendment process is R
grounded, in part, in the doctrine of popular sovereignty).
38. See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM 152, 173–75 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (discussing the impor-
tance of amendability for regime stability).
39. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 195, 240 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (“While prohibiting
precommitments which obstructed further learning, Locke, Kant and others endorsed du-
rable—though not unalterable—constitutional rules.”); see also Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 23, at 454  (asking “whether one R
generation of men has a right to bind another” and insisting “that the earth belongs . . . to the
living”).
40. Holmes, supra note 39, at 240. R
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admit that the articles, provisions, and clauses that give meaning to
those features are truly sacred, what does it say about our commitment
to a document that includes an internal mechanism for eliminating or
altering those exact articles, provisions, and clauses?  What does it
mean to admit to the imperfectability of the Constitution at the same
time that we classify the document as blessed?  Can a constitution be
imperfect and still be sacred?41  Is there an inherent paradox here?
Jefferson was curious about a similar line of inquiry, and his response
was to discourage the continued veneration of the present Constitu-
tion and to take it off of its pedestal: “Some men look at constitutions
with sanctimonious reverence,” he wrote, “and deem them like the ark
of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.”42  For Jefferson, reverence
should be reserved for other types of texts.43
Similarly, the sacred religious texts—the Bible, the Koran, the four
Vedas of Hinduism, and so on—do not allow for radical alterations, at
least not in any formal sense.44  It is true that they differ from the
Constitution in several important respects.  Most believers, for in-
stance, view sacred religious texts as “divinely or supernaturally in-
spired”; only some see the product of Philadelphia’s Constitutional
Convention as a “miracle” in a similar sense.45  Additionally, sacred
religious texts serve fundamentally different purposes and appeal to
different audiences than constitutions.
These religious texts were not written as practical documents, in-
spired by enlightenment principles, or influenced by a healthy respect
for science and rationality.  And yet there are certain similarities in
the way all of these secular and non-secular documents are described,
exalted, and admired.  Sacred religious texts are defined as such be-
cause they order the lives of believers and provide moral and ethical
guideposts by which individual followers measure their particular ac-
41. This possibility is more believable if, as I suspect, contemporary American citizens
view the idea of a constitution as more sacred than the actual physical text.  There is a
folklore surrounding the Constitution that, I am guessing, resonates more easily with the
American populace.
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), supra note 23, R
at 40.
43. Consider, for example, the Jefferson Bible. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND
MORALS OF JESUS, reprinted in JEFFERSON’S EXTRACTS FROM THE GOSPELS 125, 125–314 (Dick-
inson W. Adams ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (arranging sections from the four gospels
to create a single narrative from which to extract the philosophy of Jesus Christ).
44. It is worth repeating that I am limiting my inquiry to the more formal method of
alteration by amendment and not to the very real possibility that a text’s meaning can
change over time as a result of differing interpretations.
45. E.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR106.txt unknown Seq: 9 18-NOV-09 11:26
74 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:66
tions.46  Constitutions order lives as well.47  Ceremonies and rituals
separate sacred religious texts from the ordinary; constitutions spawn
a whole host of ceremonies and rituals.48  Sacred religious texts often
tell a story—a narrative that acts as metaphor for the teachings of the
particular sect.  More and more frequently, newly framed constitu-
tions begin by describing—often in narrative form—those events that
gave rise to the need for constitutional renewal.49  Religious texts in-
spire, comfort, influence, motivate, encourage, and so on.  Their sa-
credness, in fact, stems primarily from their ability to inspire and
elevate the human condition.  The United States Constitution is and
has been inspirational to many.  Sacred religious texts were written at
a particular point in time and they reflect the ideas and prejudices of
that moment.  So do constitutions.  Part of the success of a sacred re-
ligious text is due to its longevity and stability; indeed, most of the
sacred religious texts are hundreds or even thousands of years old.
The success of the American constitutional charter is also due in part
to its enduring quality.50
What is interesting is that these sacred religious teachings do not
include passages analogous to Article V that suggest the presence of
imperfections.  More to the point, they do not automatically invite the
possibility of amendment.  Make no mistake: These documents have
changed over time.  It is customary, for example, to view the Gospels
as representing some form of biblical amendments; they are, after all,
revisions of the narrative surrounding Christ’s life and teachings.  The
insight of Karen Armstrong, a widely published author and lecturer
on religious history, is helpful here.  She insists that edits, changes,
and alterations have been made to both the Old and New Testaments
46. Religious denominations based on the principle of monotheism, for example,
often insist that followers order their lives around the word of a single deity.
47. See Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. L.
REV. 91, 129 (1991).  Professor Murphy explains the following:
The goal of a constitutional text must . . . be not simply to structure a govern-
ment, but to construct a political system, one that can guide the formation of a
larger constitution, a “way of life” that is conducive to constitutional democracy.
If constitutional democracy is to flourish, its ideals must reach beyond formal
governmental arrangements and help configure . . . most aspects of its people’s
lives.
Id.
48. Consider the place of oaths here. See LEVINSON, FAITH, supra note 1, at 90–121 R
(examining the place of loyalty oaths within the constitutional “faith community”).
49. See BRESLIN, supra note 25, at 50–53 (citing, as examples, the constitutions of Bulga- R
ria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Cambodia, and France).
50. The United States Constitution is now the oldest enduring written constitution or-
dering a national polity.  Theodore C. Sorensen, The American Constitution: Basic Charter or
First Draft?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 709 (1998).
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for thousands of years, usually to reflect the political or cultural con-
cerns of the period.51  Recounting one of those early moments, she
writes the following:
[I]t would be many years before Yahwism became a religion
of the book.  The exiles had brought a number of scrolls
from the royal archive in Jerusalem with them to Babylon,
and there they studied and edited these documents.  If they
were allowed to return home, these records of the history
and cult of their people could play an important role in the
restoration of national life.  But the scribes did not regard
these writings as sacrosanct and felt free to add new passages,
altering them to fit their changed circumstances.  They had
as yet no notion of a sacred text.52
Armstrong contends that the practice of editing, uniting, and al-
tering the biblical narrative continued until the nineteenth century,
when a movement emerged that called for the literal interpretation of
the text.53  Before then, few could have even conceived of a literal
reading; part of the tradition of oral history is that the storyteller is
granted certain license to suggest improvements.  After the emer-
gence of this group of literalists, however, few edits or changes have
even been attempted.  In fact, the call for a literal interpretation of
the Bible, Armstrong’s account suggests, seems to coincide perfectly
with the ceasing of modifications altogether.54  Those who advocate a
literal translation of the text have, in a sense, won an important battle:
They have locked down the text and prevented the possibility of radi-
cal or tangible revisions.55  The Bible has been mostly unchanged for
close to two hundred years now.  That particular moment in the nine-
teenth century, therefore, helped to solidify the belief that the stories
captured in the Bible, once textualized, were somehow sacred and un-
alterable.  Followers, in short, had discovered the “notion of the sa-
cred text.”56
51. KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BIBLE: A BIOGRAPHY, passim (2007).
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 3.
54. See id. at 3 (noting that the Bible was not interpreted as literal fact until the nine-
teenth century).
55. Of course, they have not been fully able to prevent the variety of interpretations
from changing the book’s meaning over the years. See id. at 196–201 (detailing the rise of
conservative literal interpretation of the Bible in the nineteenth century in response to a
new “widespread hunger for certainty”).
56. Id. at 11 (relating the older tradition of biblical interpretation, in which scribes,
having “no notion of a sacred text,” adapted and amended biblical text to fit new
circumstances).
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Other religious documents include similar histories; they too
have been altered through the years and have taken on reverential
status once in written form.  And yet the ability to modify what is
printed in the text is neither announced in these religious tracts, nor
is the formal mechanism for fundamental change viewed as one of the
principal virtues of the entire document.  These documents are truly
sacrosanct; believers celebrate the solidity of their governing text as
much as they celebrate the perspective or world-view that emerges
from a collective reading of the text.  The Constitution, in contrast, is
mostly sacrosanct in spirit.  Its broad contours and its central messages
may be sacred (and that may be enough), but its particulars remain
subject to review.  It is more the idea of the constitutional document
that resonates with the American citizenry; the individual words,
phrases, and clauses are themselves vulnerable to revision or modifica-
tion.  In the end, perhaps that is what primarily distinguishes constitu-
tions from certain revered religious manuscripts.
This brings us back to the self-conscious act of signing the Consti-
tution.  Accompanied by my daughter, I too recently found myself in
Signers’ Hall of the National Constitution Center confronted with
Levinson’s intriguing dilemma: Should I ratify the text, warts and all?
Do I lend my signature to a document that I believe has changed the
world but has not always lived up to its promise?  Do I revere this text,
or is it just the idea of the text that stirs my emotions?  Do I ratify the
Constitution because of its symbolism, its meta-quality as the polity’s
governing charter, or do I focus on the individual phrases and clauses
that seriously trouble me?  Is this Constitution sacred?  Is it worthy of
reverence?
Spending a career thinking about the theory of constitutionalism
and the importance of constitutions did not make the decision any
easier.  My daughter, Molly, eagerly signed (claiming something about
just wanting to “get out of the museum to find ice cream”), but I was
not so sure.  To ratify or reject the constitutional instrument was a far
more profound and difficult decision than I had anticipated.  As it
turned out, it was precisely the imperfectability of the constitutional
text that inclined me toward ratification.  After acknowledging that
the act of signing (as well as the physical environment of Signers’
Hall) has itself become part of the ceremony and ritual—indeed, the
symbolism that renders the charter sacred—I could admit that the
Constitution’s revered status is probably just a social construction.
The idea of a Constitution of this sort was enough for me, even if I
share Levinson’s view that the text is chock full of inadequacies.  What
the Constitution stood for and its enduring potential, I concluded,
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rendered it sacred.  As such, it seems that Benjamin Franklin probably
captures my sentiments most accurately.  At the close of the Constitu-
tional Convention, Franklin addressed General Washington and his
fellow delegates and admitted to having many doubts about what they
had just accomplished.  Too weak to stand and speak, Franklin’s
friend and fellow Pennsylvanian James Wilson read Franklin’s words:
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution
which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall
never approve them: For having lived long, I have exper-
ienced many instances of being obliged by better informa-
tion, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on
important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to
be otherwise.  It is therefore that the older I grow, the more
apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more re-
spect to the judgment of others . . . .
In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with
all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Gov-
ernment necessary for us . . . . I doubt too whether any other
Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better
Constitution . . . . Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution
because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it
is not the best . . . .
On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that
every member of the Convention who may still have objec-
tions to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of
his own infallibility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put
his name to this instrument.57
57. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Sept. 17, 1787)
(statement of Benjamin Franklin), in THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 577, 577–79 (Gail-
lard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Greenwood Press 1970) (1920).
